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The Insider on the Outside: A Novel System for the
Detection of Information Leakers in Social Networks
Abstract
Confidential information is all too easily leaked by naive users posting comments.
In this paper we introduce DUIL, a system for Detecting Unintentional Information
Leakers. The value of DUIL is in its ability to detect those responsible for information
leakage that occurs through comments posted on news articles in a public environment,
when those articles have withheld material nonpublic information. DUIL is comprised
of several artifacts, each designed to analyse a different aspect of this challenge: the
information, the user(s) who posted the information, and the user(s) who may be in-
volved in the dissemination of information. We present a design science analysis of
DUIL as an information system artifact comprised of social, information, and technol-
ogy artifacts. We demonstrate the performance of DUIL on real data crawled from
several Facebook news pages spanning two years of news articles.
keyword: Cybersecurity; Online Social Networks; Information Leakers; Sensitive Infor-
mation; Threat Detection; Design Science Research.
Introduction
In the field of information security, an insider threat is defined as ‘the organisational
member who is a trusted agent inside the firewall’ (Im and Baskerville 2005). Information
security specialists try to protect against information leakage by detecting and blocking in-
sider threats brought on by actors who are, by definition, organisational insiders. Warkentin
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and Willison (2009) describe the greatest insider threat as the ‘employee or other constituent
with a valid user-name and password (who) regularly interacts with the information assets of
the organization’ (p. 102). Bishop and Gates (2008) extend the definition of insider threat
to those with access irrespective of an inside affiliation through either (a) violation of a se-
curity policy using legitimate access; or (b) violation of an access control policy by obtaining
unauthorised access. Studying areas such as user accountability to address access violations
[ADD VANCE REF] helps deal with threats from users known to the organisation, again
with a focus on access.
Rather than focusing on access, the field of finance provides a more information-centric
definition of an insider, being anyone who is privy to information that has not been released
to the general public. This is based on the concept of information asymmetry (Huddart and
Ke 2007), where an insider is deemed to be anyone who has an information advantage over
other market participants. In that context, the goal is to detect or prevent insider trading
which is the practice of trading in the securities markets by those in possession of material
nonpublic information (Karsch 1984). Following this definition, should a senior manager in
a public company share unreleased material information about company performance with
his neighbour, and as a result that neighbour trades in the public markets, the neighbour
has committed an act of insider trading and is treated as a de-facto insider (Strudler and
Orts 1999).
Following the above definition, when an organisation has information that it intends to
remain hidden, secret, or censored, anyone who possesses that information, regardless of
organisational affiliation or access control, becomes an insider. What was once considered
an organisational problem focused on identifying threats emanating from those connected
to the organisation, has quickly become a broader problem in which any member of society
at large may have access to material nonpublic content generated by users through a social
network. We harness user-generated content (UGC, see Agichtein et al. (2008)) to identify
internal and external information leakers. UGC is generally characterised by (1) a broad and
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unrestricted user base, (2) user identifying information, (3) user social network, and (4) the
contributed content. Example of UGC types include blogs, video channels such as YouTube
and micro-blogs such as Twitter.
In this work we focus on comments to articles containing incomplete information, where
the hidden information is held by insiders. Our demonstrations present censored military
articles in which the identity of personnel is withheld. Insiders – particularly those in the
know often outside of the military organisation, can share their private information through
comments. Similar forms of identity protection can be found in different domains and cul-
tures, such as non-release of rape victim names in trial reporting or nondisclosure of customer
names in corporate announcements as discussed in Yahav, Schwartz, and Silverman (2014).
We suggest that with the present information environment of social networks, cyber-security
against an insider threat must consider the external insider – the insider on the outside.
The cyber environment is becoming increasingly complex. The field of intelligence gath-
ering is concerned with covert operations, attempts to crack and access protected information
assets and supporting infrastructures, and the collection and analysis of Open Source INTel-
ligence (OSINT) (Burattin, Cascavilla, and Conti 2015; Kandias et al. 2013). In the intelli-
gence community, the term ‘open’ refers to overt publicly available sources - as opposed to
covert or clandestine sources. Hence, OSINT approaches aim at extracting knowledge from
publicly available sources (Kandias et al. 2013), which includes on-line comments. Claudio
(2009) discusses how both social network analysis and visualisation are fundamental to cyber
deterrence strategy, pointing to the growing need to develop advanced detection systems,
incorporating linguistic cues (Zhou et al. 2004) and visualisations to effectively identify OS-
INT social network threats. Earlier results reported in Cascavilla et al. (2015) describe the
information leakage problem and detection. Expanding our previous work, the present work
describes the full system view and functionality.
An abundance of information is exchanged in the commenting environments of news
articles. In this work, we present DUIL, a system for Detecting Unintentional Information
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Leakers. This novel system for information leaker detection is initially applied to a set of
censored news articles. DUIL is comprised of a loosely-coupled set of artifacts that implement
a multi-stage leaker detection process which can be generalised for the detection of leakers
in other information environments by replacing certain artifacts in the system, so long as
the UGC characteristics remain. The study and analysis of this type of system naturally
points us in the direction of design science research (DSR) (Hevner et al. 2004; Hevner and
Chatterjee 2010).
Our work presents two practical contributions. First, our work raises the important
question of leakers, who unintentionally uncover hidden information via UGC, specifically,
comments to on-line news in the public sphere. Second, we present a novel end-to-end
system that is designed to detect such information leakers, along with their social network.
We present a modular architecture system that can be tuned to any (user-) given news
context, as long as the data analysed is UGC, as we demonstrate through a collected dataset
of censored news articles.
Our work also presents two secondary theoretical contributions to design science
research that are distinct from the novel information system itself. The first theoretical con-
tribution relates to use of the Lee, Thomas, and Baskerville (2015) IS artifact framework.
We show how this framework, when applied to a complex multi-artifact information sys-
tem, improves expressiveness and clarity in presenting design science research (DSR). The
second theoretical contribution relates to the Gregor and Hevner (2013) DSR Knowledge
Contribution Framework. We draw upon the framework of Lee, Thomas, and Baskerville
(2015) to present enhancements to the DSR Knowledge Classification framework, extending
its applicability to complex multi-artifact information systems and adding expressiveness
to the original 4-quadrant classification. We believe that the above will contribute to the
consistency of DSR reporting.
This introductory section has focused on motivating the research problem, the detection
of unintentional information leakers in social networks. In our Literature Review in the next
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section, we discuss contributions addressing related research problems and elaborate on the
research gap. A formal introduction of our chosen methodology in the third section is fol-
lowed by the fourth section on the Study Scope which covers problem identification, solution
objectives, and the fifth section with a comprehensive presentation of system design. We
then demonstrate and evaluate in the sixth section the operation and effectiveness of our
DUIL system through a series of experiments designed around the current UGC context
of news commenting. Our discussion in the final section includes use of the DSR Knowl-
edge Contribution Framework to provide insights into the knowledge contribution of DUIL’s
design, and reflects upon how the IS artifact framework informs the DSR process.
Literature Review
Design Science Research
Iivari (2014) distinguishes between two different DSR strategies dominating the information
systems literature. One strategy, in the tradition of Markus, Majchrzak, and Gasser (2002)
and Sein et al. (2011) which could be called client-centric or organisation-centric DSR, begins
with an attempt to solve a specific client’s existing problem and progresses towards a gener-
alisation useful in other contexts. Iivari contrasts this with a ’proof of concept’ approach in
which a system is constructed to address a general problem and then instantiated as a test
of the design theory. We have chosen to follow the ’proof of concept’ path in the context
of a multidisciplinary international collaboration as advocated by Nunamaker et al. (2017).
This is similar to the approach taken by Twyman et al. (2014) who also address aspects
of information leakage in their work. These more recent approaches are combined with the
tradition of Hevner et al. (2004), Peffers et al. (2007), and the formalisations provided in
Gregor and Hevner (2013).
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Information System Artifacts
There has been considerable debate around the question of artifacts and their centrality to
DSR. Much of DSR work describes information technology (IT) artifacts, which Orlikowski
and Iacono (2001) and Orlikowski and Iacono (2006) define as ’bundles of material and
cultural properties packaged in some socially-recognisable form such as hardware and/or
software’. However not all agree that the ’bundled’ IT artifact should be the focal point of
information systems research in general and DSR in particular. Lyytinen and King (2004)
note that IT artifacts do not deliver value in their own right and must be viewed in the
context of a system. Schwartz (2014) advocates the decomposition of IT artifacts into
several distinct yet interconnected artifacts. Most recently, Lee, Thomas, and Baskerville
(2015) suggest a multi-artifact view when approaching DSR, arguing that the IT artifact
is just one element within a broader Information systems artifact, which should be viewed
as a construct incorporating information, social, and technology artifacts – and must be
addressed as such in design science research.
We have chosen to augment our presentation by addressing the relatively new framework
of IS artifacts articulated by Lee, Thomas, and Baskerville (2015). As we will see, this
approach is very well suited to the task and in using it to frame our work we believe we
contribute to increased understanding and potential use of the framework.
Lee, Thomas, and Baskerville (2015) define a framework, which is comprised of three
major elements as follows:
1. A Social artifact – an artifact embodying relationships or interactions among multiple
individuals;
2. An Information artifact – an instantiation of information produced by a human partici-
pant either directly (as their own creative output) or indirectly (through an individuals
invocation of a software program or other automated information production process);
3. A Technology artifact – a human-created tool used to solve a human-defined or per-
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ceived problem.
All three interact within a broader systems framework achieving a results that is greater
than the sum of its parts, comprising the IS artifact.
Methodological Approach
This study follows the established approach to design science research as applied by
Hevner et al. (2004), Hevner and Chatterjee (2010), and Peffers et al. (2007), resulting in a
proof of concept. This approach consists of five stages: 1) problem identification, in which we
define the scope of our study: detecting information leakers via commenting to on-line news;
2) going through the solution objectives, that is a set of expectations from the system and
its design; 3) artifact design, that is the design of the system, followed by 4) demonstration
with real data. The fifth stage is the system evaluation according to the objectives set in
the second stage.
The DUIL system presented in this study is the result of integrating a series of indepen-
dently developed and tested artifacts that were adjusted for the purpose of leaker detection.
Each distinct artifact addresses a key aspect of the overall system solution. The first three
artifacts, including two information artifacts and one social artifact, evolved from a study of
the nature of leakage through UGC, specifically, comments. The latter two are technology
artifacts which were developed in the context of uncovering hidden network relationships
that reveals the potential scope of the leak. The combination and integration of these five
artifacts led to the end-to-end leaker detection information system that we present.
In what follows we describe our study scope: disclosing material nonpublic information
in the form of comments to news articles in a given context, which occurs as a direct result
of social network structures.
Study Scope
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DUIL is designed to detect users who disclose material nonpublic information through
User Generated Content in social media (Agichtein et al. 2008). UGC in characterised by four
main components,(1) a broad and unrestricted user base, (2) user or personally identifying
information, (3) user social network, and (4) the contributed content.
The release of material nonpublic information can occur either maliciously or uninten-
tionally, through discussions in On-line Social Networks (OSN). It is largely common in
articles published by news pages, in which information is withheld, hidden, or censored,
only to be uncovered by a commenter. The challenges presented by information leaked
through commenting on news articles occur in many different contexts including the identity
of military personnel, minor victims, minor perpetrators, rape victims, witnesses and others
whose identity is considered information to be withheld from the public, as documented in
BlindedForReview2 (2015).
Our solution objectives centre around creating a holistic system to detect information
leakers in social networks with an initial focus on Facebook (FB) commenters. While the
social network stands at the centre of activities relevant to our work, the types and formats of
information that inhabit OSN are myriad. For that reason, modularity becomes our first key
objective enabling the use of different information artifacts to capture and analyse different
OSN information sources, with an initial focus on news articles and comments.
Automation and accuracy are two closely linked objectives. The vast quantities of infor-
mation to be processed and the accuracy of per-module results required to contain a security
breach create this necessity.
Our third objective is visualisation of leakers’ social networks. The detection and identi-
fication of information leakers is far from an exact science, and the ability to provide system
operators with visualisations of leakers’ social network – the extent of the potential leak, is
crucial to enabling quick situation assessment and response.
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System Design
The system is designed to identify information leakers through commenting to on-line
news, and provide the system user with network visualisation that presents the direct and
indirect relationships between the leakers. The architecture of the system resembles a Swiss-
Cheese model, a common model in the risk analysis and management field (Reason 1990),
in which at each level non-relevant information is filtered out, and the remaining data are
passed to the next module. In our scenario, ‘relevant information’ refers to comments that
disclose knowledge and relationships that may lead to uncovering hidden information not
released in the news article, and ‘non-relevant information’ refers to comments that do not
indicate such disclosure. We denote these comments as leak enabling and non-leak enabling
respectively. The output of the final module of DUIL is a network visualisation of the
relationship between the most relevant commenters.
The system consists of five loosely-coupled modules, corresponding to five artifacts, each
responsible for a key part of leak detection and leaker identification:
Module 1 – Articles of Interest (AoI): An information artifact that identifies news
articles in a given context. The current implementation detects articles in which personnel
names are censored. This results in the creation of an articles of interest dataset for further
analysis. It should be noted that in real-time systems, in the specific case in which an official
censor is releasing news items, this phase can be replaced with expert input such that AoIs
are flagged by the page administrator upon posting by the news agency.
Module 2 – Comments of Interest (CoI): This information artifact focuses on
comment analysis. The goal of the module is the identification of news article comment
discourse in which the commenters exhibit knowledge of sensitive information not released
in the article, hence leak-enabling. This module results in the creation of a comments of
interest set, which is passed to the next module. Here too there are multiple approaches to
generating this information and the contribution of this artifact to the information system
is not in a specific technological approach to comment filtering, but the essential provision
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of information.
Module 3 – Users of Interest (UoI): This social artifact shifts from comments to com-
menters, and their public user-profile. The objective is to filter out users with close-to-zero
probability of being leak-enabling. The remainder set of commenters and their comments is
passed to the next module. As we detail below, social network analysis of the users, their
characteristics and interactions are a core part of this artifact’s contribution, fitting well the
description of a social artifact.
Module 4 – EgoNet: Using additional publicly available information, this technology
artifact analyses relevant commenters’ egocentric networks to enable the detection of implicit
relationships between commenters, who are mutual friends. This network of relationships
potentially holds additional information that is related to the hidden content, as well as the
extent of the information leakage incident. Created specifically as a technological tool for
this purpose moves EgoNet clearly into the category of technology artifact.
Module 5 – Viz: The Viz module is a technology artifact that presents a visualisation of
leakers’ merged social egocentric networks, received as output in module 4. The visualisation
provides the system user with a tool to quickly identify the potential risk level of the leak.
As a technology artifact it can be easily re-purposed to visualise networks for other types of
information systems, but its technological capabilities as a tool remain intact.
This information system design provides for future plans in which different social media
sources are analysed to identify the sets of articles of interest, comments of interest and
users of interest based on changing criteria and cyber-security needs – necessitating a swap
of information and social artifacts.
A detailed description of each module is provided next.
Module 1: AoI
Given the large set of available FB news pages, the aim of the AoI module is to screen all
news posts and generate a database of articles that evolve around a given context: Articles of
Interest; along with the full set of comments that follows them, and the users (commenters)
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who posted them. The set of FB news pages, and screening query via regular expressions,
are defined by the system user. The output of module AoI is a database, composed of three
main tables as follows:
Posts table: a set of Articles of Interest. For each AoI we collect the source (NewsPage);
the date; and the content (text).
Comments table: a set of comments that follows the articles. For each comment we store
the post identification; the commenter identification (the id of the user that wrote the
comment); in reply to comment indicator, if the comment was part of a thread; its
date; and its content (text).
Commenters table: a set of users who commented on the post. To reduce system complex-
ity, we do not collect information on all users. We later collect information on-the-spot
on Users of Interest (UoI), in modules 3 and 4.
Module 2: CoI
The CoI (Comments of Interest) Module classifies comments into comments of interest (leak
enabling comments) or non interest (non leak enabling). The module contains two steps:
(1) an initialisation step, in which multiple classifiers are trained and tested on previously
annotated comments; and (2) a classifying step: where comments are classified into the two
classes of using the best performing classifier from step (1).
In the initialisation step, a subset of the data is first split into training and evaluation
sets. Domain experts are then asked to label the comments as ‘leak enabling’ or ‘non leak
enabling’ classes. Note that manual classification is only done once, yet is essential for the
construction of a meaningful and accurate classifier. A data-driven approach is followed to
learn expert labelling. Here, multiple classifier are constructed and trained. Each classifier
utilises all or part of the comments’ characteristics (e.g., popularity, order, length), and their
textual properties such as processed text (Bermingham and Smeaton 2011) and grammatical
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parts. Finally, the best classifier is selected based on its performance on the evaluation set.
Performance is measured by the C-statistic measure (AKA, Area Under the Curve – AUC),
that is, the capacity of the classifier in discriminating “leak enabling” comments from “non
leak enabling” comments.
To enhance system performance and avoid missed leak enabling comments, we tune the
classifier prediction-threshold to minimise False Negatives (type II error). In other words, a
comment is classified as non leak enabling if the classifier has assigned it with a near-zero
probability to be leak enabling, and leak enabling otherwise.
Module 3: UoI
Module UoI (Users of Interest) is designed to focus on commenters and their on-line user
profile, to create a ”leaker profile” of each participant. Users’ profiles are collected on
demand for the set of comments and commenters received from module UoI. On each user,
the following profile information is collected: network size – number of friends and number of
followers, and privacy setting (whether the user’s profile is kept private of public). Potentially
additional input information can be collected on each user to measure her FB engagement
and online activity.
Similar to CoI, module UoI has two steps: Initialisation and classification. In the initial-
isation step, a best data-driven classifier is selected and trained on the previously labelled
comments to estimate the probability of a commenter to be leak enabling. Here again, the
classifier threshold is set to minimise False Negatives. Those identified as UoI are then passed
to the module EgoNet.
Module 4: EgoNet
To rebuild the egocentric network of a UoI we use SocialSpy (Burattin, Cascavilla, and Conti
2015). SocialSpy was developed to retrieve the lists of friends of each UoI, given her publicly
available information, such as public friends, pictures, group memberships, and page likes.
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The tool implements four strategies, each using a different type of information from the
OSN to rebuild the friends list of a given UoI. The first three strategies are based on liked
pages. Statistics show that Facebook Like and Share buttons are used over 22 billion times
a day, on approximately 7.5 million Facebook pages (He 2013). Furthermore, like and share
information is usually available even for users with high privacy settings.
The fourth strategy exploits likes and comments from the picture of a given user. Al-
though pictures for users are only partially available when a user has high privacy settings, a
recent survey shows that many users are unaware of Facebook’s privacy options (Consumer
Reports Magazine 2012), or too lazy or inexperienced to properly modify them (Madejski,
Johnson, and Bellovin 2012). Given that, we expect that this strategy will highlight strong
relationships with the UoI and both public and private other users (Jones et al. 2013).
• Strategy 1 exploits like pages of a given profile. Based on the theory of homophily, we
can assert that other users who like the same page(s) share common interests with the
user of interest, and hence have higher probability of having friendship relationships.
Strategy 1 operates as follows. Using the public Facebook pages of the each UoI,
Strategy 1 retrieves the list of liked pages left public by the UoI profile. The strategy
then retrieves the list of these pages’ fans (users who liked these pages). Next, for each
fan Strategy 1 queries (via the Mutual Content Page (MCP) (Constine 2010)) whether
he is a friend of the User of Interest. The output of this strategy is a list of friends
tuples of the format {UoIi, friendj}.
• Strategy 2 is similar to the first strategy, yet differs in the way that probabilities are
set: users who share like pages with small sets of fans receive higher probability of
sharing friendships with the user of interest. The reasoning here is that these pages
are likely to target a narrower interest, and therefore the homophily value of the users
who like it is higher.
• Strategy 3 is the opposite of Strategy 2. That is, the probability of sharing mutual
13
friends is higher for users who like pages with more fans. The idea behind this strategy
is that, fetching like pages from max-to-min number of fans, results in a bigger user-
pool faster, even when crawling for a single page, in which mutual friendships with the
user of interest can be found.
• Strategy 4 exploits public pictures of the given user. The tool then retrieves the list of
users who like public pictures of a given UoI, or commented on them. Once the tool
obtains the list of users, it checks the friendship between them and the target ID using
the MCP.
Among these four strategies, Strategy 4 has proven to be the fastest and with the highest
average (37.12%) of friends found. Respectively Strategy 1 with an average of 17.5% of
retrieved friends, Strategy 2 with an average of 17.4% of retrieved friends and Strategy 3
with an average of 20.8% of retrieved friends (Burattin, Cascavilla, and Conti 2015). Based
on these results we follow Strategy 4 in our experiments. A detailed description of our
implementation of this strategy is given in Appendix A.
Module 5: Viz
Module Viz groups and visualises the egocentric networks obtained in Module EgoNet (visu-
alisation is done via Gephi https://gephi.github.io/). The main goals of this module are
to (1) find overlaps between leakers networks, which may provide additional information on
the profile of the leakers and the nature of the leak, (2) examine the extent and the potential
diffusion of the information leakage, thus the risk associated with the leak, and (3) provide
the system user with a network visualisation of these findings.
Summary of DUIL’s design
DUIL is designed to detect information leakers via commenting to on-line news articles with a
current focus on FB news pages. To maximise efficiency, the system follows a modular design,
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in which each module is stand-alone and can be removed or replaced by a context-specific
module designed for different purposes. Our understanding of these modules, their main
roles, and replacability within the overall IS artifact is enhanced through their respective
characterisations as information, social, and technology artifacts.
Conceptually, the system operates through three phases: First the search space is set –
the list of articles and comments that may contain information leaks (Module 1). Second,
the complexity of the analysis is reduced by filtering out noise and thus decreasing the size of
the search space (Modules 2 & 3). Lastly, the user is presented with a basis for detection and
risk assessments of the information leak (Modules 4 & 5). Figure 1 summarise the design of
DUIL.
Demonstration
In this section, pursuant to design science methodology, we present a series of case studies
demonstrating the system. We describe the collection of our test data, and show how we
used DUIL to obtain identities of leakers and their social networks.
Experimental Design
We design a full experiment based on real data collected from FB. Use of the system is
illustrated through the analysis of articles crawled from FB news pages, in which part of the
information is kept private. Specifically, we are interested in articles in which the identity
of personnel is withheld. Identity-censorship is one straightforward type of ‘material non-
public information’. Commenters in the know, can share their private information through
comments. The experiment utilises the three phases of DUIL.
Module AoI is first used to collect a set of identity-censored news articles, followed by a
thread of commenters and comments that can potentially exhibit censorship breaches. Then,
we initialise modules CoI and UoI on a subset of the articles collected. The initialisation
phase provides us with two classifiers that can be used in real-time. We evaluate the classifiers
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Figure 1: DUIL modules and architecture.
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and report their performance. Finally, we ran modules EgoNet and Viz on 14 selected case
studies. In each case we depict a subset of leak-enabling commenters (UoI) and construct
the network between them. The case studies illustrate the additional information that the
network provides, which includes capturing the leakers and their social networks, and often.
though not always, includes identifying the censored personnel.
Description of OSN Data Collected
We focus on information leakers through comments on Israeli, military-related, news articles
published in FB, in which a military personnel name is censored. Censorship in our study
is the replacement of a name with a supposedly non-identifying initial (e.g., Corporal S.).
Information leakage is detected in the comments published by private users, which leads to
the identification of the censored person.
An example of information leakage of interest is presented in Fig. 2. The headline of
the news article, as it appears on the FB page of a network news service, is: ‘Karakal
combat soldier Corporal S. who eliminated a terrorist in the course of an incident on the
Egyptian border awarded an Honourable citation: Everyone who was with us deserves it,
and of course Nathaniel who fell in the battle’. Military information policy dictates that the
identity of officers in key positions, or involved in key operations, must not be released to the
public. The motivation for this policy is a desire to protect the officer and his or her family
from being identified and potentially targeted by hostile persons or forces. In this case, the
obfuscated term ‘Corporal S.’ is identified as the censored element of the news item. A
particularly verbose comment associated with the news item states: ‘The brave combatant
is the daughter of a good friend of mine. Do you know where the combatant comes from?
From Elad of course!’. Using DUIL, the readily available identity of that commenter and
his FB Friends can lead us to the identity Corporal S. We therefore treat this comment and
other similar comments as ”leak enabling” comments. A detailed description of the case is
discussed in our previous work (BlindedForReview2 2015).
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Figure 2: Example of data leakage (translated from Hebrew).
Experimental Results
We report the results of each system module throughout the course of our experiment.
Module 1: AoI
AoI screens through a large set of FB news pages, and collects the set of relevant articles.
Screening is done via regular expressions defined by the system user.
In our experimental study, we are interested in the set of censored military-related articles,
in which the a name of a military personnel is censored. For that, we use a list of regular
expression expressions that search for a military rank, followed by an initial letter. For
example, the expression ’@lieutenant \c\.@’ corresponds to the military rank lieutenant
followed by his first initial (e.g., lieutenant D.)
The dataset collected contains 48 articles with censored personnel names, with an aggre-
gate total of 3,538 comments.
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Module 2 (CoI) and Module 3 (UoI)
In this section we present the classifiers constructed for module CoI and UoI, and discuss
their performance. We note that the classifiers we chose here are tuned for the data at hand,
and might not be optimised to other data-sets. The process of choosing classifiers, however,
is data-independent. In the following we repeat the steps of the general process, followed by
the specific tuning for our data.
We begin by splitting the set of articles into training, validation, and holdout sets. Inde-
pendent reviewers are then asked to label comments in the training set and the evaluation
set. This labelling is required for system initialisation and evaluation assessment. Ideally,
the training and validation sets consist of small samples from the data, as they are labelled
manually, yet are big enough to achieve accurate performance.
In our data, for the purpose of performance evaluation, we split the data into training
and validation only, each consisting of 50% of the data. Holdout sample may be defined as
comment to all future articles, that are not collected in the current time frame. We then
asked four reviewers to classify each comment as either leak enabling or non-leak enabling
by reflecting on the following question for each comment: ‘Based on this comment, do you
believe that the commenter knows the identity of the censored person?’. We then followed
a Delphi procedure to achieve agreement among the reviewers. We further asked them to
identify the elements of the comment that caused them to reach their conclusion.
Out of the 3,538 comments collected on 48 articles by the AoI module, the reviewers
labelled 149 (4.21%) as leak enabling comments. Interestingly, these comments are spread
out through 75% (36) of the articles. A summary of the comments classification is presented
in Table 1.
After the data are labelled, different classification algorithms are trained on the data.
Classification algorithms include but not limited to logistic regression, SVM, classification
tree, and classification forest. The methods are evaluated based on their ability in capturing
the relationship between leak enabling comments and features of the comments, using the
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Table 1: Frequency (f) and proportion (%) of comments’ classes
Comment Type f %
Leakage comments 149 4.21%
Non–Leakage comments 3389 95.79%
Total comments 3538 100%
C-statistic measure (AKA, Area Under the Curve – AUC). The features used in our current
system are divided into three families, each used by the classifiers solely and in combination
with other families. The first family contains general quantitative characteristics of the
comments, such as its order, its length, its popularity (as obtained from FB), and the present
of semiotics in the comment (smiles, winks, etc.). The second family of features is the textual
features extracted via the comment level sentiment analysis in Bermingham and Smeaton
(2011) on both processed text (lemmatized text, after the removal of stop words), and
grammatical parts such as lexical part-of-speech, gender, tense, number (singular, plural),
and person (1st, 2nd, 3rd). The last family contains the main elements mentioned by the
reviewers and are data-specific. In our context, this family include the repetition of censored
information within the comment, expression of affection, mention of a location not mentioned
in the article, or personal experience related to the content of the article.
In our dataset, out of the models we examined, the best performance on the evaluation
set, using cross validation, was that given by a logistic regression, using features from the
first and the third families of features. The output of the model and the features selected
are given in Table 2. The C-statistic of the model, that is, its capacity in discriminating leak
enabling comments from non leak enabling comments, is 81%. The performance on the model
is summarised in the Receiver-Operating characteristic (ROC) Curves in Fig. 3. The ROC
Curve depicts the trade-off between False Positive Rate and False Negative Rate for different
classification thresholds: the probability cutoff for classifying comments as leak-enabling.
To minimise missed leak-enabling comments, our system next selects the threshold that
minimises False Negatives (type II error), assuring that comments are only classified as non
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leak enabling if the classifier has assigned it with a near-zero probability, and leak enabling
else-wise.
For our data, as observed by the ROC curve, this threshold equals 0.75. Under this
threshold approximately 26% of the comments can be ruled out as non leak enabling, without
significantly increasing the model’s False Negatives (less than 5% error). This threshold is
marked with dash line in Fig. 3.
A similar process is carried for the UoI module. For our data, the best classifier achieved
for this module is the logistic regression given in Table 3. The C-statistic of the model is
60%. Given the fairly low C-statistic, the low model coefficients and their (in)significance,
we conclude that UoI module in our case study does not provide additional information on
top of the CoI module. Reasons for this can be attributed to data size and information
available for each profile. Note that this result only holds for this specific set of articles.
However UoI might be useful for other data-sets or detection purposes.
Table 2: CoI logistic model
Predictor Estimate P-value
(Intercept) -3.77 ∼0
Comment Popularity 0.00 ∼0
Repetition of censored information 2.28 ∼0
Mentions of location 0.84 0.15
Mentions of personal experiences 1.41 ∼0
Semiotics (smiles,winks, etc.) 0.66 ∼0
Expressions of affection 2.40 ∼0
Table 3: UoI logistic model
Predictor Estimate P-value
(Intercept) -0.05 ∼0
Network Size 0.0007 0.008
Followers 0.006 0.42
Privacy Setting -0.51 0.42
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Figure 3: ROC curves of the logistic models.
Module 4 (EgoNet) and Module 5 (Viz)
We run modules EgoNet and Viz on 14 articles randomly selected from our output of AoI.
For each article EgoNet and Viz are run on all users screened through module UoI. EgoNet
and Viz (re)build and visualise the friends ego networks of the list of UoI, including mutual
friends.
Fig. 4 illustrate two of the more interesting cases. The black nodes in the figure are the
UoI. UoI are surrounded by their friends, some of which are common between them.
In the first case (Fig. 4(a)) we can see that four UoI are not FB-friends: there is no
direct connection between them. They share a single friend, which we later found to be the
censored person from the article. In the second example, plotted in Fig. 4(b), it is observed
that all five UoI are strongly connected, and share multiple friends.
Due to the nature of the articles and the data chosen, that is, identity- censored article,
the ego networks may provide us with additional useful information: the identity of the
censored personnel. This information will become immediately available when the leakers
are FB-friends with this person. In the two examples we present, this is the case. In each
panel of figure 4, a single white circular node was manually confirmed to be the censored
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personnel. Confirming the censored person identity was done thanks to finding the blurred
picture from the article, unblurred in the users’ profile.
Out of the 14 experiments, we were able to identify the censored personnel in four cases.
In each of the other 10 cases, a network was constructed, and mutual friends of UoI were
found in 8 of the cases. However, we could not verify nor refute their link to the censored
personnel.
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Networks generated by module Viz.
Discussion and Conclusion
DUIL is a new type of system that can be considered as a member of the superclass
of Social OSINT systems, a form of cyber-threat intelligence system, which are growing in
importance (Casanovas 2017; Bowman et al. 2016; Jasper 2017; Nunamaker et al. 2017).
The combination of comment and user mining with risk analysis, and of social network
visualisation for risk signalling, is the main system-based contribution. This produces syn-
ergies in terms of new analytical capabilities. Such analytical requirements are a moving
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target which makes the decisions to divide components all the more important.
To provide a more granular discussion we frame DUIL as an information systems arte-
fact as presented by Lee, Thomas, and Baskerville (2015). There are few salient examples of
related work that has taken a design science approach focused on the IS artifact rather than
the IT artifact. Huhtama¨ki, Russell, and Sill (2016) perform ecosystem analytics by inte-
grating a technology artifact with other artifacts to perform visual network analytics. Both
Spagnoletti, Resca, and Sæbø (2015) and Wakefield and Wakefield (2016) tackle social me-
dia technologies as a three-dimensional information systems artifact comprised of technical,
informational, and social sub-artifacts.
Following Lee, Thomas, and Baskerville (2015), we divide this part of our discussion into
three, covering:
1. the specific IT artifacts developed,
2. the information artifacts detected and collected, and
3. the social artifact that influences, in our case, both the IT and information artifacts.
All three taken together comprise the IS artifact in which IT artifacts comes together with
other artifacts that are not strictly IT so that “they ultimately serve to solve a problem or
achieve a goal for individuals, groups, organizations, societies, or other social units” (pg 6).
AoI and CoI are information artifacts. The three data tables collected by AoI
together comprise an information artifact which serves a central purpose in the overall IS
artifact. This corresponds to the definition proposed by Lee, Thomas, and Baskerville (2015)
wherein the artifact (a) consists of an instantiation of information and (b) it is generated by
a human initiating use of a computer program in this case a FB crawler and filtering mech-
anism. Similarly, CoI is an information artifact. Corresponding to the definition wherein
the artifact (a) consists of an instantiation of information and (b) it is generated by direct
human action - in this case expert classification, combined with initiating use of a computer
program in this case a classifier mechanism.
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Such instantiations of information will recur repeatedly throughout the life and use of
the overall system. Furthermore, the design of the overall system is such at that the infor-
mation artifacts we use in the current study can be replaced, without loss of generality, by
information collected from other media sources and processed by different classifiers, thus
strengthening the appropriateness of the information artifact definition within the IS artifact
framework. In other words, it would be misleading to consider the AoI or UoI as technology
artifact, as it is not a technology making the decisive contribution but rather the information
gathered at this stage.
UoI is a social artifact. The UoI module meets the frameworks definition of a social ar-
tifact in that it reflects relationships or interactions between or among individuals, involving
the social and not just the individual. This characterization is seen in the social-behavioral
data collected and processed by this artifact which includes number of friends and FB user
activity.
EgoNet and Viz are technology artifacts. In EgoNet and Viz we have instantiations
of pure IT artifacts as defined by the IS artifact framework. Both are human-created tools
used to solve a problem or achieve a goal. In the case of the former the goal is to (re)build a
previously unknown egocentric network, and in the case of the latter provide visualization.
Taken together, and given the interactions and interdependencies between the two infor-
mation artifacts, one social artifact, and two IT artifacts, we have a prototypical example of
an IS artifact as per the Lee, Thomas, and Baskerville (2015) framework.
Other than defining three of many possible artifact types, Lee, Thomas, and Baskerville
(2015) provide little guidance on determining artifact categorization and we note that such
categorization may not be obvious. For example, one might argue that a given artifact
such as our AoI is a technology artifact rather than an information artifact when observing
that it is a software technology enabling automated identification of the relevant articles.
However in making this assessment we look to the main contribution of the artifact to the
design which, in the case of AoI is not in the technological way in which the information was
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achieved, but in the essence of having collected the information itself.
Based on our experience we have found that the concept of artifact contribution can
be essential in determining whether an artifact should be viewed as social, information, or
technology. We emphasize that the distinction is not always clear cut and requires careful
consideration. Table 4 summarizes.
The Lee et al approach to IS artifacts is not without controversy. Juhani (2016) points
out, that Lee et al. simply interpret IT artifacts as purely technical ones which he considers
a potential shortcoming. We have found, however, that this narrow definition when used
alongside the complementary social and information artifacts, enables a rich and precise
descriptive and analytical discourse. Amongst other critiques, Juhani (2016) questions how
Lee, Thomas, and Baskerville (2015) might associate their work with extant approaches to
design science as this is not explicitly addressed in their work. We believe that our work
has provided an initial answer to this question, and we have found and demonstrated that
the Lee at al. framework can coexist quite nicely with traditional design science. Finally,
Juhani (2016) questions how design science research would make direct contributions to the
non-IT artifacts in the Lee et al. framework. We have found that the characterization of
certain artifacts as social or information eases their placement and analysis within an overall
IS design project. Rather than opening an unmanageable distance between the artifact and
DSR, it forces us to think in terms of the actual contribution of each artifact to the IS rather
than limiting our assessment to technological contribution.
Meeting the Objectives and Assessing Contribution
Our system design goals specified three sets of objectives: modularity; automation, and
accuracy; visualization of leakers’ social networks.
The modularity goal is achieved by the choice of architecture. Most important in this
respect is the ability to replace Module 1 : AoI (Articles of Interest) and Module 2 : CoI
(Comments of Interest) with alternatives that can process other forms of social media. Sep-
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Table 4: Determining artifact type




Information Q. Does the fact that a technology is used to gather the
information not make these technology artifacts?
A. No, as the technological implementation is not what
contributes to the system design.,There are multiple, per-
haps equally valid, technological approaches. The contri-
bution of the artifact lies in the information, not the tech-
nology.,Different information sources plugged into this
artifact might require alternative technologies.
Users of Interest Social Q. The user data is provided by FB which is a technol-
ogy implementing a social network, so perhaps this is a
technology artifact?
A. No, as the technological implementation is not what
contributes to the system design. There are multiple pos-
sible social networks that might be analyzed as part of the
information system. The contribution of this artifact to
the overall information system lies in the social structures
provided, not in the technology that supports it.,Different
social networks plugged into this artifact might require
alternative technologies, and provide different social in-
sights.
EgoNet Technology Q. This artifact is meant to provide information about
network structures, so perhaps this is an information ar-
tifact?
A. No, as the contribution of this artifact to the system
was to enable the creation of the required network struc-
tures where no such capability previously existed.
Viz Technology Q. This artifact presents social structures in a visual man-
ner so perhaps it is a social artifact not a technology ar-
tifact?
A. No, as the primary contribution of this artifact is
to determine a visually effective way to present network
data. This contribution is technological in can be repur-
posed for use in different network domains.
27
arating out Module 3 : UoI (Users of Interest) further extends the desired flexibility for
different OSN structures.
Automation and per-module accuracy goals have been partially achieved at the proof-
of-concept level as demonstrated by the experiments. Accuracy is measured via the AUC
measure for the statistical module, yet cannot be measured for the Viz module, as we later
discuss in the limitation section. Further experimentation will be required in these areas.
The visualization of leakers’ social networks goal has been achieved as illustrated by the
experiments and accompanying graphs.
Beyond meeting the objects set at the outset of the system design process, we briefly
address DSR knowledge contribution as discussed in Gregor and Hevner (2013). Their
framework assesses contribution on the axes of x:problem maturity and y:solution maturity.
Scaling regions of high and low for each axis gives the four quadrants of:
1. Routine design (high,high) applying known solutions to known problems, resulting in
no major knowledge contribution;
2. Exaptation (low, high) extending known solutions to new problems, resulting in re-
search and knowledge contributions;
3. Improvement (high, low) developing new solutions to known problems, resulting in
research and knowledge contributions; and
4. Invention (low, low) inventing new solutions for new problems, resulting in research
and knowledge contributions.
Identifying leakers of material nonpublic information is not a new problem, as we see
from the analogy to insider trading and organizational information leakage described in our
introduction. However the shift of this problem from inside the organization to the broad
context of social media has introduced significant new complexities to the problem, changing
important problem characteristics particularly with regards to scale and scope. Therefore
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Figure 5: DSR knowledge contribution framework with multiple artifacts (after Gregor and Hevner
(2013)).
on the problem maturity axis DUIL would score a mid-range value rather than a clear high
expected of an improvement and clear low expected of an invention. On the solution maturity
axis the DSR contribution of DUIL is clearly in the low range owing to the novelty of the
approach and previously un-attempted combination of artifacts in a complex information
system artifact. Therefore based on the criteria set out by Gregor and Hevner (2013) our
DSR contribution lies in the upper right of the improvement quadrant extending slightly into
the invention quadrant. We present this graphically in Figure 5 modelled after the Gregor
and Hevner framework.
In testing their framework Gregor and Hevner (2013) presented a table of 13 design
science articles classified by knowledge contribution type. They document the classification
of a single contribution per article, into a distinct quadrant of the grid. We suggest that
when following the multi-artifact approach to IS artifacts, research value can be revealed
by mapping the contribution of each component artifact when presenting an information
system. We therefore have enhanced the original DSR contribution framework diagram to
show the positioning of the sub-artifacts that comprise the DUIL information system artifact.
Each artifact type is represented by a different symbol.
The two information artifacts, AoI and CoI appear in the routine design quadrant. These
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artifacts use a combination of human intervention and text processing that are well-known
in the art and applied to many text classification problems. Therefore they rank high on
both axes of problem maturity and solution maturity. This means that taken on their own
these artifacts provide no research and knowledge contribution.
The two technology artifacts, EgoNet and Viz, appear in the exaptation quadrant. Here
we have examples of two technologies that have been used successfully in other domains,
being re-purposed to solve a new problem. Therefore they rank high on the solution maturity
axis and low on the problem maturity axis.
The social artifact, UoI, appears straddling the routine design and exaptation quadrants,
with a slight advance upward into the improvement and invention quadrants. This indicates
a solution design that has elements of routine use (tracing the known social networks of
commenters, for example), elements of exaptation (finding new uses of the social structures
for leak containment), while being applied to a newly complex instantiation of an existing
problem.
Following the DSR knowledge contribution guidelines and enhancing the graphical pre-
sentation for multiple artifacts, helps to effectively express the knowledge contributions of
DUIL.
Limitations
Though DUIL reaches its design and security goals, there are some unavoidable limitations
and shortcomings. The main limitation of DUIL is reliance on human intervention for
initialization, thus can be considered a semi-automated information system. Specifically,
four actions are done manually:
1. In module AoI, system user defines the context, formulated as a list of regular expres-
sions. Alternatively, page administrator can flag articles that need to be monitored for
potential leakers.
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2. Initialization of CoI involves experts annotation of a sufficient training set. Expert
annotation is customary in classifying UGC.
3. In modules CoI and UoI, system users can, but are not obligated to, control the list of
data features and classifiers, according to their domain knowledge and experience.
4. Modules EgoNet and Viz provide and overview of the potential leak and involved
leakers, yet it is up to the user to carry on further analysis of the threat.
The second limitation of the system relates to the expert annotation, which is needed
since no ground truth is available. In practice a comment can be misclassified by reviewers
as leak enabling, while in fact it is not.
The third limitation stems from the use of statistical models in a Swiss-Cheese fashion.
Modules AoI (if pre-post labeling was chosen), CoI, and UoI may introduce some statistical
errors (false positives and false negatives) into the system. These error are carried on through
the modular design, resulting in potentially increased error rate.
Future Research
Given the great popularity of OSN, they have become one of the most common means to share
and discuss information, including news articles. We find that comments and commenters’
OSN leak information, originally withheld in news articles. To underline the importance of
this issue, in this paper we present DUIL, a system we designed and implemented to analyze
news comments in order to detect information leakers and assess the risk associated with
such leaks. We ran real-data experiment on military news articles, the results underlines
the effectiveness of our approach in finding leakers amongst UoI and (re)building their social
network. Moreover, our tool was able to de-censor the information in some of the articles.
This study, aside from the primary contribution of knowledge created by our specific IS
artifact, has secondary theoretical contributions. It provides a crisp illustration of how the
IS artifact framework espoused by Lee, Thomas, and Baskerville (2015) can effectively aid
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in the description and analysis of a complex system, and has extended the use of Gregor and
Hevner (2013)’s DSR knowledge contribution framework.
Detection of leaked information, identification of a leaker, and quantification of the im-
pact of a leak are three distinct yet interrelated challenges faced by organizations in the age
of OSN. DUIL was designed and implemented with the holistic view of addressing all three
of these challenges. Through DUIL and the systems that follow it, organizations will be able
to assess and address their exposure to the risks of information leakage. With the inher-
ent structure of OSNs turning more users into bearers of material non-public information,
addressing these challenges will continue to grow in importance.
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Appendix A: Implementation of EgoNet Strategy 4
1. EgoNet receives as input the list of UoI.
2. For each user in the list, EgoNet obtains the set of publicly available albums, and
public pictures within these albums (line 1 of Algorithm 1).
3. For each picture the tool collects the identities of users who commented or liked the
picture (line 4; the users who left a comment or pressed the Like button are defined
respectively in the algorithm with U ci and U
l
i .)
4. Using MCP (Constine 2010), EgoNet
- checks whether the UoI and a given user are friends ‘Facebook friends since [date]’
(line 7);
- if yes, retrieves the list of common friends (line 8).
5. Lastly, EgoNet, returns the list of the ‘Friends Found’ (line 9).
Algorithm 1 implements the steps taken for each user in the UoI set.
(Magazine 2012; Inc. 2015)
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm of Strategy 4
Data: UoI uoi
Result: Set of friends of uoi
1 I ← set of public images of uoi
2 CandidateFriends← ∅
3 foreach i ∈ I do
/* Add candidate friends set all users that liked or commented the
image */
4 CandidateFriends← CandidateFriends ∪ U li ∪ U ci
5 FriendsFound← ∅
6 foreach c ∈ CandidateFriends do
/* Check friendship with Mutual Content Page */
7 if AreFriends(c, uoi) then
8 FriendsFound← FriendsFound ∪ {c}
9 return FriendsFound
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